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Myths of the Great War
I love stories on the news about Vera Lynn, evacuees, rationing, allthat fun stuff. But I don’t mean to be rude, but just I don’t want to hearmore about the mud, the trenches, the barbed wire and the massiveloss of life (respondent quoted by British Future 2013: 16).In Bruce Bairnsfather’s celebrated cartoon, two infantrymen of the GreatWar cower in a foxhole while shells fly overhead (Figure 1). One says tothe other: “Well, if you knows of a better ’ole, go to it.” Their passivemisery captures much of how the Great War is remembered today.Most wars are rich in tales of agency and decision. Yet many tales ofthe Great War are told otherwise. A dominant narrative of the Great Wartells us that we were passive victims of an irrational disaster: Everythingthat happened was done to us; we scarcely know by whom.Perceptions of the Great War continue to resonate in today’s world ofinternational politics and policy. Most obviously, does China’s rise show aparallel with Germany’s a century ago? Will China’s rise, unlikeGermany’s, remain peaceful? The Financial Times journalist GideonRachman wrote last year:The analogy [of China today] with Germany before the first world waris striking … It is, at least, encouraging that the Chinese leadership hasmade an intense study of the rise of great powers over the ages – andis determined to avoid the mistakes of both Germany and Japan.”1The idea that China’s leaders wish to avoid Germany’s mistakes isencouraging, certainly.2 But what are the “mistakes,” exactly, that theywill now seek to avoid? The world can hardly be reassured if weourselves, social scientists and historians, remain uncertain whatmistakes were made and even whether they were mistakes in the firstplace.
1 “The shadow of 1914 falls over the Pacific,” Financial Times,February 4, 2013.
2 While much attention has been focused on China’s rise and theGerman parallel, less has been given to Russia’s decline, which in someways resembles that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and has no lessdisturbing implications: two sprawling, multi-national empires, strugglingto manage a fall from past greatness, rising ethnic tensions, and externalrivals competing for influence in bordering states.
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The myths of the Great War challenge the skills of both historians andeconomists. Historians face the challenge of preserving and extending therecord and contesting its interpretation – especially when reasonablepeople differ over the meaning. If anything challenges the economist, it issurely persistence in behaviour that is both costly and apparently futile orself-defeating.Closer study of the historical record of the Great War reveals a storyfull of foresight, intention, calculation, and causation. Some consequencesthat are commonly thought to have been unintended were consideredbeforehand and fully discounted; others were not consequences at all.
Myth #1. An inadvertent warInterviewed earlier this year at Davos, Japanese premier Shinzo Abelikened China and Japan today to Britain and Germany in 1913.3 Hecommented on the similarity of their rivalry. He noted that they shared astrong trading relationship and that a century ago this had not preventedstrategic tensions leading to the outbreak of conflict. Today, he concluded,any “inadvertent” conflict would be a disaster.Historians and politicians have focused on moral responsibility for thewar. Whom should we blame? In 1918 Lloyd George demanded “Trial ofthe Kaiser” (Purcell 2006: 75). By 1920 he had changed his mind. In alater memoir (Lloyd George 1938: 32) he wrote:The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of warwithout any trace of apprehension or dismay.The allocation of moral blame for the Great War is still debated. A recentsurvey of ten professional historians (BBC 2014) placed Germany first inline with 9 votes (out of 10), but with many also-rans: Austria-Hungary (7votes), Russia and Serbia (3 each), and Britain and France (2 each). Twoof the ten gave equal weight to all the belligerents.From a social-science perspective the underlying issue is less moralthan empirical: Was the Great War truly an “inadvertent” conflict, one thatstarted when no one was looking? When the actors decided on war, towhat extent did they calculate their actions and intend the results? The
3 “Davos leaders: Shinzo Abe on WW1 parallels, economics andwomen at work,” Financial Times, January 22, 2014. Subsequently theChinese foreign minister Wang Yi was reported as rejecting the parallelon the following grounds: “1. The parallel is a misleading one. Militaryconflict is now unthinkable. 2. Japan caused the second world war. This isunambiguous.” “Davos: China rejects Abe’s WW1 analogy,” FinancialTimes, January 24, 2014.
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economist’s standard model of strategic interaction demands evidence ofindividual agency (rather than of unconscious collective drives), ofunbiased “rational” expectations, and of backward induction of one’s ownbest choice based on the expected best choice of the adversary.It is a myth that such calculations were absent from the decision forwar. On the contrary the record shows that the war was brought aboutvery largely by design, and among those that designed it there wasrealistic foresight of the scale, scope, character, duration, and evenoutcome of the war.Several versions of the Great War deny or qualify agency. These aretraditional stories of nationalism, imperialism, and coordination failure.According to them, national leaders were trapped into actions they didnot intend by commercial interests, the demands of the mob, and alliancecommitments. In fact the historical record has left clear evidence ofagency and intention.In every country the decision for war was made by a handful – literally– of people at the apex of each political system (Hamilton and Herwig2004: 238-241). Their councils were “saturated with agency” (Clark 2013:xxvii). The cliques themselves were not united, so that there were alsowaverers in every country including the German, Austrian, and Russianemperors, the German premier Bethmann Holweg, and the British financeminister (later premier) Lloyd George. At crucial moments, however,those that favoured war were able to sway the others.An implication is that the war was not inevitable. Minor variations inthe course of events and the personalities involved might have haddifferent outcomes. The Sarajevo assassination killed a voice for peace inVienna and also made it more difficult for similar voices to be heard(Fromkin 2007: 154). In the powerful words of Margaret MacMillan(2013: 605): “There are always choices.”No one was swayed by commercial interests, which were against thewar in all countries (Hamilton and Herwig 2004: 241-248), or by publicopinion more widely, which was taken by surprise (Ferguson 1999: 174-2011). Public opinion was considered, only to bolster the legitimacy of theactions the actors had decided to take anyway. In Germany, for example,Moltke (cited by MacMillan 2013: 480) wrote to Bethmann Holweg afterthe so-called “imperial war council” of December 1912 that “we can …face even the most difficult tasks with confidence, if we manage toformulate the casus belli in such a way that the nation will take up armsunitedly and enthusiastically.” No one was trapped into war by alliancecommitments. Instead, they considered carefully whether or not tohonour them, or even went beyond them. Thus in its “blank cheque” toAustria, Germany went far beyond its alliance obligation. Italy, in contrast,went to war in 1915 against its former allies. Nor were they trapped into
4
war by the pressure of mobilization timetables; in both Berlin and StPetersburg, the war advocates exploited the timetables to force thewaverers to commit to war (e.g. Herwig 1977: 25).What ruled the calculation in every country was the national interestas they perceived it. But on what was the “national interest” based? Aseverywhere, on shared beliefs and values.4 These began with nationalidentity, in which the well-being of the nation was commonly identifiedwith persistence of the ruling order. They extended to shared values ofpower, status, honour, and influence, and then to shared beliefs about theforces underlying the distribution of power in the world. Strikingly, thedecision makers in every country were subscribers to a virtual worldwhere the zero-sum game of power was being played out, not thepositive-sum game of commerce and development.There is clear evidence that some of the actors had a specific intent tobring about a war. Two things muddy the water. One is the efforts madelater to destroy the evidence and distort the record (Herwig 1987).Another is that those that intended war did not have the same war inmind, although they still understood the wider conflict that could follow(Fromkin 2007). In Vienna chief of the general staff Hötzendorf andforeign minister Berchtold intended war with Serbia in order to assert theintegrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, knowing that the Russiansmight intervene and so widen the conflict. In Berlin chief of the generalstaff Moltke and war minister Falkenhayn planned war with Russia beforethe Russian rearmament would be completed, knowing that this wouldalso entail war with France. To bring war about, they also encouragedeach other: when the Germans encouraged the Austrians to make war onSerbia in July 1914 among them were those that expected this wouldprovide the best opportunity to attack France and Russia (Hamilton andHerwig 2004; Fromkin 2007). Similarly, the Russians and French eggedeach other on, although the Russians had their eyes on Austria and theFrench on Germany (McMeekin 2013: 54).Is it true that everyone expected a short war? According to a FinancialTimes Editorial for New Year’s Day, 2014:
4 On the “national interest” see Hamilton and Herwig (2004: 239). Amuch praised history by Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers (2013: 560),also comments on the idea of shared political culture: “we should [not]minimize the belligerence and imperialist paranoia of the Austrian andGerman policy-makers … But the Germans were not the only imperialistsand not the only ones to succumb to paranoia. The crisis that bought warin 1914 was the fruit of a shared political culture.” Use of terms such as“belligerence” and “paranoia” conveys Clark’s agenda, more moral thaninvestigative.
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In 1914 some European politicians and generals, their outlook shapedby the limited wars that had unified Germany and Italy half a centuryearlier, harboured this illusion.5But it was not, in the main, “politicians and generals” that suffered fromthe illusion. It was mainly the ordinary uninformed citizens that expecteda short war. The “short war” illusion arose from the warnings of Bloch(1899) and Angell (1910) about the destructive force of modern warfareand the dependence of prosperity on economic interdependence. Themilitary had heard the warning and had discounted it (Macmillan 2013:305-306). In reality the idea of a short war was not so much a sharedillusion as a shared hope: starting from Schlieffen, everyone hoped thewar could be short.Military planners also realistically evaluated the likelihood that suchhopes would fail. Schlieffen’s staff warned that quick victory might well bereplaced by “a tedious and bloody crawling forward step-by-step” (Clark2013: 561). Updating German war plans in 1905 and 1906, Moltkehimself envisaged one possible outcome as “a people’s war, one whichwould not be concluded in a single battle” but a “murderous Europeanwar,” a “general European massacre, at whose horror one could onlyshudder,” a “long and protracted struggle” that would continue until “thepeoples’ energy had been entirely broken”; if victorious, Germany wouldstill be “exhausted in the extreme” (Herwig 2002: 688-692). Preparing forwar, German administrators planned how to feed the population underblockade (Lee 1975). Moltke himself explained that respecting Dutchneutrality would provide Germany’s “wind pipe,” or neutral channel tooverseas trade (Herwig 2002: 689. These considerations made sense onlyin the expectation of a protracted war in which national resources wouldbe mobilized and brought to bear.Across the Channel in August 1914, while others expected a short war,war secretary Kitchener thought “if things go wrong the war might lasttwo or three years at least” (cited by French 1988: 387). Prime ministerAsquith anticipated “Armageddon.” French and Russian generals lookedforward to the “extinction of civilization” (Clark 2013: 561).In strategic interaction, the principle of backward induction requireseach player to work out the best choice from predicting their adversaries’likely responses. To what extent did the Great Powers do this in 1914?Within the governing cliques of the Great Powers, each had reasonableunderstanding of the others’ war plans, based on open signals andconfirmed by covert intelligence (Macmillan 2013: 314-352). That is, each
5 “Reflections on the Great War,” Financial Times, January 1, 2014.
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government shared a broad understanding that, if Austria attacked Serbia,Russia would probably mobilize against Austria and Germany; Germanywould probably attack France as well as Russia; and Britain wouldprobably come in on the side of France (Herwig 2002). Austrian foreignminister Berchtold promoted aggression “even though our operationsagainst Serbia should bring about the great war.” From Berlin, Wilhelm IItold Vienna to count on “Germany’s full support”; he wrote that Germanyfully expected war with Russia and for years had made all preparationswith this in mind.Each country’s likely reaction was not known with certainty, and thereare well known moments when they were misread. But the theory ofdeterrence (Schelling 1966 92-125) does not require certainty; indeed,deterrence is thought to be more effective when each side retains somediscretion. Of course, leaving the adversary in a state of uncertainty is notthe same thing as being uncertain oneself, and the latter conditionreflected the influence of the waverers.To what extent were the war makers simply over-optimistic? In thiscontext, over-optimism would have a specific meaning: that the sum ofprobabilities of expected victory among the great powers would exceedone. Evidence of over-optimism is strikingly absent among those thatbrought the war about in Berlin and Vienna. Possibly there was over-optimism in St Petersburg: both Russians and Germans overestimatedhow quickly Russia might became stronger than Germany. In the present,however, both German and Austrian leaders had clear premonitions ofdefeat (Berghahn 1973; 2013; Ferguson 1999: 13; 2005: 19). As warbegan, German war minister Falkenhayn put it: “Even if we go under as aresult of this, it still was beautiful.”. In Vienna Hötzendorf told hismistress: “It will be a hopeless struggle, but … such an ancient monarchyand such an ancient army cannot perish ingloriously.” The Austrian KaiserFranz Joseph wrote: “If we must go under, we better go under decently”(from Herwig 1997: 11, 22, 37).Far from optimism, their attitude is better described as rational
pessimism: they did not expect victory, but they did view the expectedpayoff from remaining at peace as inferior to that from war. Thus Moltketold Hötzendorff on 12 May 1914: “To wait any longer means adiminishing of our chances” (from Herwig 1997: 51). Bethmann Holwegto Kurt Riezler, 7 July 2014: “Russia’s military power growing fast …Austria grows ever weaker … The future belongs to Russia, which growsand grows into an ever greater weight pressing down on our chest” (fromErdmann 1972: 181-93).Could the Great War have been avoided? The case continues to bemade that avoidance of war in such circumstances can be achieved by
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mediation and accommodation. Gideon Rachman, for example, hascontrasted “Munich” and “Sarajevo”:If leaders warn against “another Munich”, they are almost alwaysadvocating a tough response to aggression – usually military action. Ifthey speak of “Sarajevo”, however, they are warning against a drift towar.6From the perspective of managing China’s rise, Rachman continued:This year’s centenary of the outbreak of the first world war could dothe world a great service by persuading modern politicians to spendmore time thinking about Sarajevo, and less time worrying aboutMunich.But this assumes the Great War was the “inadvertent” conflict oflegend. In fact there was no drift, no lack of foresight, communication,realism, or calculation. There was no lack of mediation. In the July crisisthe British government made repeated offers to mediate, but in Berlinthese were seen as a complication, and German responses were designedonly to avoid public blame for the onset of war when it came.Rather, war came in 1914, unlike in previous crises, because in thatmoment the great powers did not deter each other. From this perspectivethe reality of 1914 looks not unlike 1939, when only a credible deterrentmight have stopped Hitler in his tracks. As Margaret Macmillan (2013:503-4) has shown, the Victorians understood deterrence perfectly well.War broke out in August 1914 because, in that moment unlike all thepreceding moments, the Austrian and German governments wereinsufficiently deterred. There was an added problem in 1914, becauserational pessimism changes the balance of fear: there is no value inwaiting and no merit in avoiding risky actions if you fear the future morethan you fear your enemies. This is a problem that we may face againtoday with declining regimes in Moscow and Pyongyang.In 1914 there was also a deeper cause of war. This was theconfinement of decision making to secretive councils where the nationalinterest was understood on the basis of military beliefs and values. Inbusiness and society, no one wanted war. As Max Warburg told theKaiser: “Germany becomes stronger with every year of peace. We can onlygather rewards by biding our time” (from Herwig 2011: 13).
6 “Time to think more about Sarajevo, less about Munich,” FinancialTimes, January 6, 2014. See also Skidelsky (2003).
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Empirically, open political systems that aggregate widely held socialpreferences and exercise civilian control over military authority appear toengage in warfare more reluctantly and so more selectively than theirauthoritarian counterparts (Levy 1988). There can be adverse sideeffects; for example, democracies might be inhibited from undertakingdecisive military action that would deter aggression by others. Thus aworld where democracies and non-democracies coexist is not necessarilymore peaceful. It seems beyond dispute, nonetheless, that if German andAustrian councils had given due weight to middle and working classopinions in 1914 there would have been no Great War.
Myth #2. Needless slaughterThe Great War took place in an era of mass armies. This era began in the1860s, when the railway technology first enabled the assembly anddeployment of multi-million armies (Onorato et al 2012), and ended inthe 1970s when battlefield nuclear weapons and cruise missiles deprivedthe same mass armies of their viability.Angell and Bloch warned that warfare in the age of mass armies wouldbe militarily horrendous and economically and socially unbearable. In thisthey were partially correct: the wars were certainly horrible, butEuropean societies proved all too capable of carrying unprecedented warmobilizations for years at a time.The focal point of the Great War was conflict between Germany andRussia, triggered by the gradual disintegration of the Austrian andOttoman Empires. In fact, this was the point of the war: Germany went towar in the West, only in order to secure the conditions of victory in theEast. In this sense there is an exact parallel between the two World Wars.The two wars differ, however, in where the outcome was decided. Inthe Second World War, the Eastern front was decisive: this is where themain forces were concentrated and the main battles were fought. In thefirst World War, in contrast, the decisive engagements took place on theWestern front. In fact, Germany won in the East, and was then defeated inthe West.In the West, the decisive conflict took the form of a war of attrition.The original German war plan was for an offensive across Belgium andFrance, ending in destruction of the French army within six weeks.Although the French Army suffered its worst losses of the war, it did notcollapse, dug in, and was quickly buttressed by a small Britishexpeditionary force.Britain went to war with a strategy of attrition, which required theimmediate raising of a mass army. At first there was no intention to sendthe new army into battle on the Western front to kill and be killed;
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Kitchener planned to wait, perhaps until 1917, while the French and theRussians wore the Germans down, and then intervene with “the lastmillion men” that would decide the war (French 1982; Bourne 2005:129).As things turned out, however, before 1914 was over the British Armywas fully engaged. The first, second, and third millions went to war longbefore 1917. Once the front line of trenches and dugouts settled intoplace, attrition became the norm. Attrition is an ugly word, designed toconceal the attempt to exchange wounds and deaths with the adversary ata favourable rate. Generals on both sides accepted casualties on a scaleunthinkable by modern standards in the hope that the enemy’s loss wouldbe greater. On an average day of a war that lasted more than four years,more than 6,000 soldiers died of all nationalities, including 2½ thousandof the Central Powers and 3½ thousand of the Allies (from Urlanis 1971:209). Britain’s worst day was the first on the Somme, 1 July 1916, with20,000 killed and missing.Attrition was a reality; was it pointless? That idea was founded on tworates of exchange: lives for lives, and lives for territory. Lives for territory:In most battles on the western front until 1918 only a few yards changedhands for thousands or tens of thousands of casualties.7 Lives for lives:When the Allied armies traded with the enemy, they consistently came offworse. Figure 2 reports British and German casualties in the British sectoras monthly averages. It separates the 16 months from Neuve Chapelle tobefore the Somme, and the 29 months from the Somme to the Armistice.Two things are clear. First British losses rose greatly with the forcesdeployed. Second, British losses consistently exceeded those of theadversary in the same sector: by nearly two to one in the first period andstill by 1.5 to one in the second. (The time profile of French losses issomething of a mystery – to me, at least – and are a gap in this paper.)At that rate, the Allied policy of attrition was irrational. WhenFalkenhayn launched the battle of Verdun in February 1916, he expected
7 What a difference a few yards make! On an average day of WorldWar II the Red Army alone suffered 5,000 deaths in combat or behind thefront line (from figures reported by Barber and Harrison 2006: 225). Thedefeat of Hitler’s Wehrmacht still took almost four years, so that averageday came around 1,416 times. Yet Stalin’s generals are mostlyremembered as heroes, not donkeys. One reason may be that their mentook Vasilevskii, Zhukov, and Kon’ev more than 2,000 kilometres fromStalingrad to Berlin. But an emphasis on movement is to mistake thepurpose of combat. Its purpose is not to take territory or even to achievelocal breakthroughs but to destroy the enemy’s fighting power. The fact isthat fewer lives were spent in the destruction of Germany’s fightingpower in World War I than in World War II.
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to lose two of his own men for five French soldiers. He would drainFrance of blood (Herwig 1997: 182). Germany, not Britain, would havethe last million.Did the Allied generals see this? The British commanders’ allegedfailure to learn is embodied in Alan Clark’s (1961) invented epithet:“Lions led by donkeys.” Niall Ferguson (1998: 242-281) has alsomaintained that, given their great advantage over the Central Powers ineconomic capability, the Allies’ failure to win the war more quickly mustbe explained by disorganization and incompetence: an “advantagesquandered.”In fact, commanders on both sides made repeated efforts to escape thelogic of attrition. The problem was that every effort seemed to come tonothing. In the category of efforts intended to save lives on the Westernfront fell the artillery preparations with which Allied commanderspreceded major attacks (ineffective more often than not), Churchill’sattack on the underbelly of the Central Powers via the Dardanelles (acostly failure), the Allied blockade of Germany (slow acting at best), andGerman submarine attacks on Allied and neutral shipping (arguablyineffective and certainly counter-productive in bringing America into thewar).If these escapes from attrition led nowhere, it was also dangerous toretreat into passivity. This was the insight of the sociologist TonyAshworth (1980: 204-226). Left alone, he observed, the soldiers on bothsides of the trenches lapsed into “live and let live”. Between the greatoffensives, the commanders could choose to let their men to keep theirheads down, or keep them on the alert by means of regular raids acrossthe front line to gather intelligence and take prisoners. Raiding was costly,and increased casualties on both sides, and so stimulated hostile feeling;passivity emphasized the adversaries’ shared interest in keeping violenceat the level of harmless ritual. Ashworth concluded that the Britishpreference for frequent raiding may explain why the British did not sufferthe mutinies that spread through the French army in 1917.Beyond the tragic loss of life, attrition had a further consequence: itinteracted with the rapid expansion of the armies on both sides to lockthem into a vicious circle of declining quality. But this was moreimportant for the British than for others.At the outbreak of war, the British sent a small, well-trained, andexperienced army to France. Within a few weeks the survivors had beendecimated by losses from their own ranks, and further diluted by themuch larger numbers of fresh recruits. The number of survivors fromeach attack was critically important because the task of further learningand improvement fell to them (Griffith 1996: 3; Corrigan 2003: 274-276).As Figure 3 illustrates, in seven months from Mons to Neuve Chapelle (in
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February 1915) the monthly survival probability of British officers andmen was more than 90 percent; but in the rapidly growing British armythe monthly average share of those that had survived at least one monthin France was little more than 60 percent.The figure plots these two statistics, the survival rates and survivorshares, through the war for the British and German armies. The Germanyarmy was affected by the same logic, but to a much smaller degree,because it entered the war on the Western front already at one third of itswartime maximum, rather than zero in the British case. As can be seen, inevery period the British army was disadvantaged. The men’s survival ratewas lower, and the survivor share was lower. For both armies the gapbetween the survival and the survivor share tended to close as the size ofthe army in the field stabilized, but the gap was initially far wider for theBritish army, and it closed in the final period of the war only at theexpense of a declining survival rate.Based on manpower alone, a strategy of attrition was self-defeating:the Allies could have expected to lose the war. Kitchener’s last million(men) turned out to come from America, which no one anticipated in1914. During the war, however, the solution to attrition presented itself,and the Allies were better able to grasp this solution than the CentralPowers. The solution on the Western front would be broken not bymanpower but by firepower. Additional firepower was supplied by theAllied economies, which were incomparably richer than those of theCentral Powers. First to grasp this was Lloyd George, who echoedKitchener in 1915 by claiming that Britain would raise the “last million”(pounds) that would win the war (Macdonald 2006: 403).The balance of economic advantage is easily illustrated. Figure 4 offersa gross comparison of the Allied advantage in prewar GDP andpopulation, and in men mobilized in wartime. It is a snapshot, rather thana moving picture, so it rolls up Russian and American resources into asingle number, ignoring the fact that Russia was dropping out as Americacame in. Still, these were the resources available. Allied GDP was morethan three times that of the Central Powers; population more than twice;men mobilized more than one and a half times. Figure 5 shows a similarcomparison limited specifically to war production. In tanks (especially),airplanes, machine guns and rifles, the Allies comfortably outproducedthe Central Powers; only in artillery did they fall short.It was in the economic dimension of attrition that the stalemate wasbroken, leading to Allied victory. Their economic advantage allowed theAllies to compensate for heavy casualties by superior accumulation anddiversification of firepower (Prior and Wilson 1992; Strachan 2003).Allied artillery bombardments became effective against opposingtrenches when intensified above a calculable threshold. Allied
12
infantrymen were re-equipped with offensive weapons such as riflegrenades, trench mortars, and portable machine guns, and weresupported by growing numbers of airplanes and tanks. Taken togetherthese allowed the infantry to return to the principles of fire-and-movement. What made this possible was the vast dimensions of the Alliedproduction mobilization; and also American reinforcement in 1917 whichadded a million men (but with little experience), and some elements offirepower (but with little heavy artillery) (War Office 1922: 628).A vital feature of resource mobilization for the Great War is that ittook time on both sides. The importance of time is easily illustrated. Thinkof the war in two halves, separated in the middle of 1916. This appearsnatural from a British perspective, because the battle of the Somme,which opened on 1 July 1916, became the iconic engagement of theBritish Army in the Great War, based on its terrible casualties andminimal gains.Griffith (1994) called the war after the Somme the “larger second halfof the war.”8 A surprising aspect is by just how much it was larger thanthe first half in every dimension. In Figure 2 and 3 we saw already howthe numbers of soldiers mounted through the war, so that casualties ofthe second half in the British sector outweighed those of the first half byan order of magnitude. In the second half of the war the Somme was nolonger an exceptional engagement. Using two separate estimates (oneofficial, the other by Griffith), Figure 6 illustrates how the number ofdivision-level battles involving British forces rose rapidly, month aftermonth from 1915 through 1916 and 1917 to the end of the war. By theend of the war, moreover, the resources being deployed in every battleexceeded those of earlier battles by large multiples. This was enabled, inturn, by very large increases in combat stocks. At the time of the Sommeoffensive, on 9 July 1916, the British Army held more than 6.5 millionshells in France and a further 1.1 million at home. By the time of the 1918spring offensive, on 9 February, the equivalent numbers were 16.5 millionand 11.3 million (War Office 1922: 481).Behind this lay the expansion of production, illustrated in Figure 7. Inthe 30 months from the Somme to the end of 1918, British industryproduced more than twice as many rifles, more than 5 times the numberof shells, 9 times the number of machine guns and aircraft, and 33 timesthe number of tanks compared with the similar period up to the Somme.
8 Griffith also noted an “early-war bias” in history and literature, basedon the time of “amateurism, blundering, and fumbling” when most of theserious fighting was left to the French, and most of the poetry was written(and perhaps the poets were able to write it because the British sectorwas quiet most of the time).
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Not surprisingly, there was an answering mobilization on the Germanside, most notably the “Hindenburg plan” of war-industry constructionadopted in August 1916; the best account in English, almost half a centuryold, is still that of Feldman (1966). Our quantitative picture of the Germanindustrial mobilization over time remains lamentably incomplete,however. Figure 8 infers from somewhat incomplete evidence that themonthly rate of explosive powder production in Germany between theSomme and the Armistice was most likely around three times the monthlyrate of the period before July 1916 (the horizontal axis of this figure isscaled to match that of Figure 7). Another focus of the Hindenburg planwas on artillery. It is known that over the war period as a whole Germanyalone outproduced the Allies in guns (including both Russia and the USA),but we lack the timing of this achievement. Other data reported in thefigure put Germany’s submarine construction after the Somme at aroundtwice the rate beforehand. These numbers, while not spectacular, areevidence of German success to compare with that of the Allies.Three things clearly undermine the German economic record,however. First, the German production programme clearly neglected theairplanes and tanks that could give supporting cover to the attackinginfantry and would prove decisive in 1918.Second, under the Hindenburg plan huge efforts went into buildingnew explosive and gun factories, and these took the German economy intothe realm of excessive mobilization. By the middle of 1917, wrote Germaninterior minister Karl Helfferich (cited by Feldman 1966: 273), therewere:everywhere half-finished and finished factories that cannot producebecause there is no coal and there are no workers available. Coal andiron were expended for these constructions, and the result is thatmunitions production would be greater today if no monsterprogramme had been set up but rather production had beendemanded according to the capacities of those factories alreadyexisting.Third, the industrial mobilization precipitated the disintegration of theGerman economy, the collapse of living standards, and an urban famine,the causes of which we will consider further below. As a result Germanycould not reap the dividend from the collapse of the Eastern front. By1918 more than 2 million men available for military service were beingheld back from the front to work in Germany, alongside thousands ofsoldiers returned from the front (Bessel 1988: 24-25). By this point theGermany Army had too many guns for the men available to fight, and stillnot enough food (Herwig 1997: 264, 410). On one hand “the new artillery,
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trench mortars, and machine guns rusted on loading docks.” On the otherhand, the troops were afflicted by “hunger and thirst,” which drove themthrough the year’s spring offensive: as they advanced they quicklyexhausted their own supplies, which they made up by looting theabundance that they found in Allied stockpiles, but the search for foodand wine slowed the advance.In short attrition worked, not in the generals’ understanding of it,which was indeed narrow-minded and pre-modern (Offer 1989: 352), butin Lloyd George’s concept: When the financial and industrial strength ofthe central powers was finally exhausted, the Allies still had the lastmillion.Should the Allied victory have come sooner? Ferguson (1998) arguedthat, given their material advantage, the Allies should have won in twoyears. Evidently “the Germans were significantly better at mobilizing theireconomy for war than the Western powers.” The Allied advantage, heconcluded, was squandered.There is some merit in this line of thinking. The British army of 1914had to face a new problem – but the problem should not have beenthought of as completely new because it had been encountered before inthe American Civil War and the Boer War. Could the Allied economicmobilization have benefited by learning from these earlier experiences ofmass warfare? Yes (according to Trebilcock 1975). There is clear evidencethat the Allied commanders’ learning from experience was slow andunaccountably erratic; should they have been quicker to learn how to usetheir material advantage without wasteful losses? Again, yes (according toPrior and Wilson 1992; see also Griffith 1994: 192-200). It seems theBritish Army, at least, lacked the analytical capability to learnsystematically from experience. The German Army was a more innovativeand effective combat organization. It is true that the British Army, theonly one not to be broken by its own offensives, was transformed by1918, but the transformation could have been quicker and many liveswould then have been saved.It is unreasonable to conclude, however, that the German economywas better organized. On the contrary, the German generals that ran thedomestic war effort from 1916 made some terrible mistakes. They endedup with war factories they could not supply or operate, and soldiers andcivilians they could not feed. Lacking the advantage of materialsuperiority, these were mistakes they could not afford.In a paper summarizing our joint work on the subject, however,Broadberry and Harrison (2005b) concluded: “Total war takes time.”Learning from defeat, building and training armies, equipping the armywith new weapons, and equipping industry to supply the weapons: thesethings all took years. Both sides mobilized, but neither side fully
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anticipated the additional efforts that would be required to match theother’s mobilization. The war eventually drained economies of resourcesin reverse order of their strength, so Russia first, then Austria andGermany. There was also error and wastage. Clausewitz (1968: 167)would have recognized these as no more than the “friction” that makeswar “a resistant medium for every activity.” Those who decide over warand peace must anticipate the tragedies, crimes, and mistakes that gowith war and also serve, incidentally, to prolong it.Why, exactly, was the war so bloody? The mass killing of soldiers inthe Great War is sometimes ascribed to the advantage of the defenders. Atfirst, attacking infantry could not suppress machine guns and barbedwire. Heavy artillery could do this, but how to do it was poorlyunderstood. The result was a static war in which territory rarely changedhands. The entrenched armies exchanged terrible casualties wheneverthey left the relative safety (Strachan 2003) of the trenches and dugouts.This situation began to change late in the war. In 1917/18 theoffensive began to regain the advantage. Attacking infantry acquired moreversatile weapons and more intensive support. The result was thatwarfare became mobile again, and once again territory changed handsfirst this way, then that. As fighting moved into the open, however,casualties rose.In the next war it was easier to attack than defend. From the start,infantry everywhere engaged in fire-and-movement, supported byaircraft and tanks. The result was mobile warfare on a global scale. It isnotable that military casualties of World War II tragically exceeded thoseof World War I by a large margin. The conclusion is inescapable that masskilling did not arise from being immobilized in trenches or fromunimaginative military leaders too stupid to think their way around theobstacles. The casualties that arose when warfare became mobile wereeven higher. Mass killing was the result of warfare in the era of massarmies, not from the particular form it took in the Great War.To conclude, in the Great War, despite material advantage, the Alliescould not escape the war of attrition. Attrition meant slaughter. Some ofthis slaughter was the kind of pointless, wasteful killing that happens inevery war. The rest of it was the killing demanded by mass warfare.Attrition was not only slaughter, however. There was an economicdimension as well as the military one. It was the combined attrition inboth dimensions that defeated the Central Powers.
Myth #3. The food weaponFood was an essential element of two world wars (Collingham 2011).Moreover, food security was a core element of German war preparations
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(Lee 1975). Despite such preparations, many believed, Germany wasstrangled by the British (later Allied) blockade. The food weaponappeared to have been decisive: Germany was starved into submission.This belief has historic significance. After the war it helped to sustainthe notion (attributed to Germany’s wartime leaders Hindenburg andLudendorff) that Germany remained unbeaten militarily; the army wasbetrayed when the home front folded. The memory of the blockade alsoran deep in the national socialists’ project to restructure Europe inGermany’s interest by force, as when Hitler (cited by Collingham 2011:37) remarked in 1939: “I need the Ukraine, so that no one is able to starveus again, like in the last war.”The idea that Germany was starved into defeat is highly plausible,although it would have astonished prewar observers. At the outbreak ofwar Germany imported 20-25 percent of calories for humanconsumption; for Britain the equivalent number was 60 percent. It wasnatural for Angell and Bloch to suppose that in wartime Britishconsumers would suffer first.In prewar 1913, as Figure 9 suggests, the average British and Germandiets were quite comparable. In the outcome British food supplies wereconstrained and their average composition deteriorated somewhat. As thesame figure shows, however, the decline of food availability to Germanswas much more severe.In Britain sugar was rationed from the end of 1917 and various meatsand fats during 1918. The access of low-income families to food improvedsomewhat, so there was a degree of equalization (Gazeley and Newall2013); this seems more likely attributable to the high demand for allkinds of labour than to rationing itself. In Germany price ceilings andrationing were introduced in 1916 for bread and flour, meat, fats, and oil.Food rationing supplied only 50-60 percent of required calories, soeveryone had to go to unofficial sources to survive. In this setting thewealthy had the advantage. Based on average height of soldiers bornbefore and during World War I, the war saw both an average decline andan increase in inequality (Blum 2013). Excess mortality among Germancivilians is estimated at around 750,000, most likely because of hungerand hunger-related disease (Davis and Engerman 2006: 204).Two factors confound this story. One is simple: Germany went to warwith its principal trading partners. Angell and Bloch had argued forcefullythat great powers heavily dependent on trade should not attack thesources of their own prosperity. But this is exactly what Germany did(and Shinzo Abe was right to note the fact). The German economy wasmuch more interlinked with its future adversaries than its future allies. In1913, Britain, France, Italy, and Russia accounted for 36 percent of
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prewar German trade (Gartzke and Lupu 2012: 131).9 The same figure forAustria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire was only 12 percent.Britain alone accounted for a bigger share of Germany’s trade than thelatter combined. Russia was a major source of German food and animalfodder. From this perspective, Alan Kramer (2013) has pointed out, muchof the “blockade” was no more than an Allied decision not to trade withthe enemy. No blockade was necessary to interrupt trade across no man’sland.Germany’s loss of trade, however, was not the only supply shock.Prewar plans for wartime autarky assumed that German farmers wouldhave to farm more intensively to feed the nation (Lee 1975), but the warmobilization stripped German farms of young men, horses, and chemicals.Further shocks came from farmers’ incentives. At the same time thatbattlefronts and blockades cut off food imports across open borders, warmobilization restricted the domestic supply of manufactured goods to therural market. Although food prices soared, farmers retreated to the insideoption of self-sufficiency. When civilian officials stepped in to controlprices, the attraction of the inside option only increased.In his economic history of the war Gerd Hardach (1987: 34) askedhow economic warfare interacted with Germany’s economic mobilization.He conjectured that:“The tremendous economic decline of the Central Powers between1914 and 1918 was caused less by the blockade than by the excessivedemands made on their economies by the war.”Hardach did not suggest how to implement this comparison, but thereis a simple way to consider its possible validity in the German market forfood calories. Start from the fact that before the war Germany importedup to one quarter of calories for human consumption. Note that therewere two welfare losses, one arising from the trade shock affecting thequarter that was imported and the other arising from the mobilizationshock affecting the three quarters produced at home. Is it reasonable tosuppose that the loss from the shock affecting the one quarter wassmaller than the shock affecting the three quarters?Figure 10 separates the wartime increases in the price of calories thatare attributable to the curtailment of foreign trade and to the internalmobilization. The resulting welfare losses correspond to two triangles.While the height of each triangle cannot be ascertained, its base is known.The welfare loss from the blockade (ABC) was proportional to prewar
9 Fergsuon (1998: 253) gives a higher figure for the share ofGermany’s prewar imports from wartime adversaries: 48 per cent.
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trade, whereas the loss from mobilization (OCD) was proportional toprewar consumption. Since trade in calories was at most one quarter ofprewar consumption, and not all trade was cut off, it follows that thewelfare loss from mobilization was likely to have exceeded the loss fromthe blockade by a multiple.10We do not count the welfare loss arising from price ceilings andrationing on the grounds that these were largely ineffective. On theevidence of Blum (2013) they redistributed welfare adversely, but arebest ignored for present purposes.Finally, it is worth noting, the blockade of Germany continued throughthe armistice to Germany’s acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles in June1919 and, extended to the Baltic, became even tighter. With the fightingover and German soil under German control, trade sanctions were nowthe Allies’ only coercive lever to ensure that Germany came to terms. Thepostwar blockade was bitterly unpopular in Germany and its continuationbecame a source of lasting resentment. Yet, as Offer (1989: 388-391)reports, prices did not rise and rations did not fall. The most obviousexplanation is that the end of military mobilization allowed somedishoarding.It was both plausible and convenient for politicians of the war periodand later to blame German’s wartime economic difficulties on the Alliedblockade. This must be largely a myth. The blockade was not the onlyfactor in the disruption of German trade. The disruption of trade was notthe only factor that disrupted the German internal market for food.Arguably, the military mobilization of agricultural resources into war, andthe economic mobilization of industry, had a larger disruptive effect thanthe shock from foreign trade.
Myth #4. Folly at VersaillesThe Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and the Reparations Commission that itestablished imposed heavy burdens on Germany. Having witnessed thenegotiations Keynes (1920) strongly criticized the process on twogrounds: it violated the terms of the Armistice (which limited Germanreparations to making good civilian damages arising from the war) andthe resulting burden on the German economy was intolerable and wouldbe counterproductive.Keynes may well have been right; the reparations burden wasevidently intolerable since successive German governments did nottolerate it. But what in fact were the consequences?
10 This line of argument has a precedent in Williamson (1968: 21-23).
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Many serious consequences have been ascribed to the indemnityimposed on Germany in 1921. According to the financier andphilanthropist George Soros (2014), for example, to the French“insistence on reparations led to the rise of Hitler.” There are present-dayimplications for, Soros continues, “Angela Merkel’s [similar] policies aregiving rise to extremist movements in the rest of Europe.”The German hyperinflation of 1923 has also been attributed toreparations. According to Brookings vice-president (formerly a Turkish
government minister and UN administrator) Kemal Derviş (2014), “had Germany’s hyperinflation of the 1920’s – a direct result of the war – beenavoided, Hitler may well never have risen to power.”The burden of German reparations determined in 1921 was certainlyheavy and probably unwisely so. The evidence is plain to see in the betteroutcome of 1945, when the victors based retribution on evidence ofpersonal culpability, not collective responsibility. Still, the mistakes of1919 to 1921 should be kept in perspective.In 1921 the Reparations Commission issued A, B, and C bonds, ofwhich the C bonds were designed symbolically to appease various Alliedconstituencies; only the A and B bonds were held to be within Germany’sability to pay. The A and B bonds together have been valued at about oneyear’s prewar German GDP (Ritschl 2005: 68-70). This was comparable tothe French indemnities of 1815 and 1871 (White 2001). Taking intoaccount Germany’s Treaty losses of territory and capacity, and addingnon-reparations obligations to the Allies, Webb (1986) estimates thecurrent burden at around 10 percent of Germany’s postwar GDP.Alternatively, Ritschl adds the A and B bonds to Germany’s existing publicdebt to find a total of around 1.5 times Germany’s GDP, which looks heavybut not overwhelming when compared with the sovereign debt liabilitiesof France and the United Kingdom in 1921 (2.6 and 1.5 times GDPrespectively).11Germany’s centre-left government did not want to pay reparations outof taxes. The problem was not the burden of attempted compliance; theproblem was that Germany did not comply. The clash with the Allies led,in early 1923, to the French occupation of the Ruhr in an attempt toextract reparations in kind by compulsion. The German governmentwrote another blank cheque, this time to fund the efforts of the localpopulation to frustrate collection. As Webb (1986) has described, theanticipation of unbounded future fiscal deficits triggered hyperinflation.
11 Data by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff athttp://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/ (accessed 23 February 2014).
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Notably, however, there cannot have been any unique channel fromGerman reparations to hyperinflation because the hyperinflation of thetime was not unique to Germany. As Keynes (1920: 223) prescientlyremarked, “The inflationism of the currency systems of Europe hasproceeded to extraordinary lengths. The various belligerentGovernments, unable, or too timid or too short-sighted to secure fromloans or taxes the resources they required, have printed notes for thebalance.” Hyperinflation was a regional phenomenon, spreading beyondGermany through Russia, Poland, the Baltic, Austria, and Hungary(Bresciani-Turroni 1937; Dornbusch 1991; Harrison and Markevichforthcoming). Throughout central and eastern Europe, fragilegovernments presiding over newly constituted nations spent beyondtheir means, and compliant central bankers monetized the resultingdebts.To generalize, every case of hyperinflationary meltdown of that timebegan from a civil war of attrition (in the game-theory political-economysense of Alesina and Drazen 1991) among domestic interests that preferto postpone stabilization in the hope of shifting the burdens ofstabilization disproportionately onto others. The only aspect unique toGermany was the foreign dimension: as external bondholders the Allieshad a hand in the German game.The story that links reparations to hyperinflation does not flow,therefore, from the consequences of Germany’s meeting an intolerableobligation; rather, all the effort on the German side went into avoidance(Marks 1978). A new war of attrition followed between the German andAllied governments, and the hyperinflation was a predictableconsequence, triggered when holders of Mark-denominated governmentliabilities began to anticipate unbounded future government deficits.After stabilization came the first of many reschedulings. There wasalso a peace dividend. Hantke and Spoerer (2010) note something thatKeynes and others entirely neglected: the Treaty provisions that limitedGerman interwar rearmament gave Germany fiscal breathing space.Restrictions on the size and equipment of Germany’s armed forcesreduced the burden of military spending. In equilibrium they probablyreduced military spending across Europe. To estimate the peace dividendrequires a counterfactual hypothesis which is not straightforward, but inHantke and Spoerer’s most conservative scenario it was large enough tocover at least 90 per cent of the reparations actually paid in the yearsfrom 1924 to 1929.If the economic implications of the Treaty have been oversold, thesame is true of its political consequences. The electoral history of theWeimar Republic may conveniently be broken into three phases: 1919 to1924 (with four parliamentary elections), a period that included the
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imposition of the Treaty of Versailles, the announcement of reparations,the hyperinflation, and the first rescheduling of reparations under theDawes Plan; 1925 to 1929 (including the election of May 1928), a periodof stability that ended with the Great Depression and anotherrescheduling of reparations under the Young Plan; and 1930 to 1933(with four more elections) ending in the Hitler dictatorship.Figure 11 shows the evolving pattern of proportional representationin the German parliament. In the first phase the parties of the centre andleft lost support dramatically, their vote share falling by 30 percentbetween February 1919 and June 1920. The votes were picked up on bothfar left and right by parties opposed to the new republic, some becausethey wanted the monarchy back, others because they supported Sovietrevolution. As yet, neither the Treaty nor the reparations were knownquantities. In the May1924 elections, in the wake of the hyperinflation,the national socialists put in a first showing, winning nearly 7 per cent ofthe seats. But at the same support for the centre-left was recovering. Atthe second 1924 election the extremists’ vote collapsed and that of thecentre-left was further consolidated.In May 1928, three and a half years later, despite a background ofcontinued agitation on the reparations issue, the grip of the centre-leftwas still stronger; the communists gained little ground and support forthe national socialists remained below 3 percent.It was not until the hammer blow of the Great Depression thatconditions were laid for violent polarization and the breakthrough of theradical right to national significance and power (Van Riel and Schram1993; King et al. 2008).In other words, from the Dawes Plan to the Great Depression theGerman electorate showed a substantial and growing majority forconstitutional rule by the “Weimar parties.” Were it not for the GreatDepression, Hitler and his infamous co-conspirators would have lived tothe 1960s and died in obscurity in their beds.In setting out to punish Germany for the war the authors of the Treatyof Versailles lacked wisdom and enlightened self-interest. Contemporarycritics of the Treaty in Germany and abroad made the most of this. But itis wrong to look here for the causes of the Hitler dictatorship and WorldWar II. It was in the middle of defeat that the German high commandlaunched the Fatherland Party demanding peace with annexations Eastand West (Howard 2002: 98), but it was still September 1918, before theArmistice and long before the Peace. And it was in the expectation of anearly victory that Bethmann Holweg proposed the “Septemberprogramme” to restructure Europe as a German empire (Hastings 2013:100), in September 1914 when the war going well, not 1919 whenGermany had been saddled with “war guilt” and reparations, and not
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1924 when hyperinflation had done its worst. It was the end of the war,not the terms of the peace, that Germany’s far right would not accept.The most that can be said against the Treaty of Versailles is that it didnot help. It was bad diplomacy and, given what diplomacy is supposed toachieve, that is bad enough.
Concluding remarksWe have reviewed four widespread narratives of the Great War. Each is atthe crossroads of economics, politics, and strategy. Myths are notnecessarily baseless, and we have tried to distinguish truthful elements,but their part in the overall story was often relatively small.According to one myth the Great War was an inadvertent conflict; ittranspired without intention or calculation. In fact, the decisions that ledto the Great War were calculated with considerable foresight of the widercosts and consequences. The spirit of those that started the war is usefullydefined as “rational pessimism.”Another myth considers that most fighting on the Western front tookthe form of needless attrition. There was attrition, and this was adeliberate strategy on both sides. From the Allied standpoint this looksscarcely rational because the rate of exchange of casualties was alwaysadverse. The missing dimension was economic: the “last million” wasmeasured in firepower as well as manpower. The Allies outproduced theCentral Powers in firepower (and everything else) and this was the basisof victory. But there was no escape from attrition, and no other way ofwinning the war but by the sacrifice of millions of lives.A myth of historic significance is that the Allies used food as a weaponto starve Germany out of the war. While German civilians suffered greatly,in part because of the Allied blockade hurt, it seems likely that Germanactions hurt more. These included the decision to attack Germany’s maintrading partners, the impact of Germany’s economic mobilization on theinternal food market, and the overblown scale of the Hindenburg plan.A final myth is that the Treaty of Versailles, which concluded WorldWar I, laid the foundations for World War II. Many aspects of the Treaty ofVersailles would seem to fail the test of enlightened self-interest on theAllied side. Despite this, the electoral impact of the Treaty, thereparations, and the hyperinflation of 1923 were short lived. In the mid-1920s and as late as the Reichstag elections of 1928, German society wasset on a course to political moderation and stability.The Great Depression, which struck Germany in 1929, then broughtback to life the dark forces of radical nationalism that led to World War II.These forces were engendered long before World War I. Let loose by thewar, they were caged by the German defeat and Weimar democracy put
23
them into a coma. The Treaty of Versailles, foolish or not, set the terms ofthe peace. They stirred, but slept on. It was the Great Depression thatreawakened them so that they sprang back to life.
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Figures
Figure 1. “Well, if you knows of a better ’ole, go to it.”
Source: Bairnsfather (1917). Thanks to Major and Mrs Holt, Bairnsfather'sbiographers, for permission to reproduce this image.
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Figure 2. British and German military deaths on the Western front, British
sector, monthly average, before and after the Somme
Source: Calculated from War Office (1922: 358-362).
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Figure 3. Total British and German military personnel and monthly
casualties, survival probabilities, and survivor shares on the Western front
Sources: British data are from War Office (1922, pp. 64(iii) and 253-271);German data are from McRandle and Quirk (2006, pp. 682-685 and 696-696). All figures relate to the first of the month. Numbers of Britishofficers and other ranks present on the first of September throughNovember 1914 are found by linear interpolation on the figure for 1December 1914 and zero for 1 August; the same procedure is used for 1May and 1 July 1916. German numbers for 1 August 1914 are found bybackward extrapolation from September and October.For both armies, casualties are killed, died, wounded and sick, missing,and prisoners.The survival probability is the ratio of the actual number present onthe first of the current month to the gross number, where the latter isdefined as the number present on the first of the previous month pluscasualties over the month. A simplifying assumption is that men arrivingat the front within a given month did not become casualties until the nextmonth or later.The survivor share is the ratio of the actual number present on the firstof the previous month to the gross number on the first of the currentmonth, using the same definition of gross number and the sameassumption as for survival probabilities.
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Figure 4. The Allied material advantage: Prewar GDP and population and
wartime military mobilization
Sources: Prewar GDPs and populations from Broadberry and Harrison(2005, pp. 7-8 and 10); men mobilized from Urlanis (1971: 209).
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Figure 5. The Allied material advantage: cumulative wartime production
Sources: War production from Adelman (1988: 45), except UK fromBroadberry and Howlett (2005: 212) and Austria-Hungary from Schulze(2005: 88).
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Figure 6. Number of divisional battles on fought by British and Empire
forces on the Western front
Source: Totals are given by Griffith (1994: 18). Monthly averages arecalculated from the totals. Griffith describes the official figures (coveringBritish forces only) as "more exhaustive (or pedantic, if you will).”
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Figure 7. British war production after the Somme, monthly average, ratio to
before the Somme
Source: Annual data from Broadberry and Howlett (2005: 212). Figuresfor 1916 are distributed equally between the first and second halves ofthe year.
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Figure 8. German war production after the Somme, monthly average, ratio
to before the Somme
Sources: Explosive powder: Feldman (1966: 152-3, 268, 272, 494) givesfigures for December 1915 (4,000 tons), July 1916 (6,000 tons), February1917 (6,400 tons), April 1917 (8,000 tons), May 1917 (9,200 tons), andApril 1918 (12,000 tons). I assume that these figures were selectedbecause they are salient, and I interpolate linearly between them. I take1,000 tons as the monthly figure for August 1914, and I assume that amonthly output of 12,000 tons (the target of the Hindenburg plan) wasmaintained through November 1918. Submarines: Davis and Engerman(2006: 232-233).
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Figure 9. British and German food consumption, pounds per head per week,
1913 and 1918
Source: Davis and Engerman (2006: 210).
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Figure 11. Elections to the Reichstag, February 1919 to March 1933
Sources: 1920 to 1933 (Berghahn 1982: 284-285), supplemented byfigures for February 1919 from “German Federal Election, 1919” athttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_1919 (accessed23 February 2014). The German People’s Party (DVP) under Stresemannis allocated to the centre from 1923 to 1929, and to the conservativeparties otherwise.
